The Response against Gilbert Ryle’s Myth of Volition

Authors

  • Md. Ezazul Karim University of Oklahoma

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18533/journal.v9i3.1875

Keywords:

Volition, voluntary action, involuntary action, official doctrine, myth of volition.

Abstract

Volition or will power is considered to be important in order to explain and signify our action. Gilbert Ryle who is a classical figure in the realm of philosophy of mind argues against the myth of volition. The purpose of this paper is to the response against Gilbert Ryle’s conception of the myth of volition. In order to do that at first, I will describe the Cartesian doctrine of Rene Descartes. Then I will explain the official doctrine along with the categorical mistake. Afterward, I will describe Ryle’s myth of volition following the explanation of the four criticisms that he sets forward to refute this myth. And finally, I will response against each of these significant criticisms. 

Author Biography

Md. Ezazul Karim, University of Oklahoma

Philosophy

References

Cooney, B. (2000). ed. The Place of Mind. New York: Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Doney, W. (1967). ed. Descartes. New York: Anchor Books.

Priest, S. (1991). ed. Theories of the Mind. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Robinson, D. (1998). ed. The Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ryle, G. (1983). The Concept of Mind. New York: Penguin Books.

Wilson, D. (1969). ed. The Essential Descartes. New York: The New American Library.

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Published

2020-04-05

Issue

Section

Conference Paper