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Civil Defence and National Security: Composition and Implementation Model in National Defence

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ABSTRACT

Civil Defense is inherent part of every citizen in many countries anywhere in the world, which differ only in the implementation of the program. The difference depends on the threat level and needs of each country in mobilizing citizens. However, the Civil Defense's Governance which involvement of citizens is already regulated in a number of regulations and legislation, but as one part of an integrated program linked to the involvement of citizens in the framework of national defense, civil defense program is not enough to have its own laws. So that when applied in the form of operational, interpretation of these programs tend to be not in tune and even have precisely the opposite perspective between the state and citizens. This paper argued that the Civil Defense program is part of an integrated governance program of national security. Therefore, the state should be required to ensure that the program of Civil Defense goes well. This paper is also offer the composition and program models associated with the Civil Defense, Conscription Program (drafted) and Reserve Component. The argument of this paper is that the Civil Defense Program is a linear and continuous with Conscription and Reserves Programs.

Keywords: Civil Defense, Conscription, Indonesia Armed Forces (TNI), National Defense, National Security, Reserve Component.

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1.0 Introduction

A growing debate in Indonesia related to the Civil Defense program initiated by the government in the substance of National Defense is a surprise. That is because National Security is an integrated civilian duty in many countries in the world, with specific implementation of the program in each country.² The difference depends on the level of national security and need of each country in mobilizing citizen. The debate emerged as the government does not fully explain the implementation of Civil Defense program

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² Grossman, Andrew D. (2001). *Neither Dead nor Red: Civil Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War*. New York: Routledge. Specially Chapter 1.

to the people. There is an impression that the government, as the implementer, is not well-prepared to present the program to the public³. Basic questions related to the program are swirly answered and made public strongly reject the program as part of democracy process, simply because the government is considered not transparent in running the Civil Defense program.⁴

The policy of involving citizen in State Defense is already regulated in a number of regulations and legislation, but as part of an integrated program linked to the involvement of citizens in the framework of National Security, unlike Civil Defense which is not yet to have its own policy. It is not strange when comes to program implementation, the interpretation of these concept look similar and raises contrary opinions between State and Citizen⁵.

This paper argues that Civil Defense as integral program of National Security. Therefore, the state should ensure the Civil Defense program runs well focusing on five issues: legal aspect of the program, availability of supporting infrastructure, adequate budget, coordination with other ministries and relevant agencies involved, and the purpose of the program. Based on the five issues, the running program can align with the program to where the involvement of civilian, voluntary and mandatory, in Civil Defense program is integrated with the National Security scheme.

It will also propose the composition and program models associated with Civil Defense Conscription program (draftee) and Reserve Component (*Komponen Cadangan—Komcad*). The idea of this paper is that Civil Defense Program is linear and continuous with the Conscription Program for *Komcad*. Once a Civil Defense program is implemented, automatically, there will be offers for conscript in *Komcad* program with the composition, model, and integrated program based on threat and the need for civil mobilization against threats.

2.0 Civil defense in national security

Theoretically, Civil Defense is an integral part of the National Security. The Government sees people as part of the state where they aware that organic military institution alone is not enough to Defend the State. However, the understanding of Civil Defense is divided in two perspectives, namely:

First, Civil Defense is not directly related to State Defense, the Civil Defense has been a government program in form of civil resilience by providing guidance and assistance in preparing, responding and recovering from public emergencies resulting from conflicts or natural disasters⁶. The key point of this Civil Defense concept is to deal with emergencies, protecting and restoring public services and facilities that have been destroyed or damaged by natural disasters and the impact against human activities. The main task of Civil Defense in this context is to ensure that the public is aware of the dangers and comes with instructions on how to avoid danger, especially disaster.

However, Civil Defense in the context of civil resilience should be organized into civil organizations and their personnel should be respected and protected, subject to a protocol, particularly to the resilience section. They are entitled to perform civil defense tasks except those involved in paramilitary⁷. This concept is strengthened in post-Cold War because it is based on the belief that in the post-cold war, the possibility of open and conventional war is impossible in the future⁸. In this context then National

³See, *cnn Indonesia* (2015). "Kontras: Bela Negara Tidak Harus Lewat Militer". <http://www.cnnindonesia.com/politik/20151012202602-32-84538/kontras-bela-negara-tidak-harus-lewat-militer/> (accessed 29 November 2016).

⁴ See *Kompas* (2015). "Menhan: Bela Negara Bukan Wajib Militer" <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/10/20/05470071/Menhan.Bela.Negara.Bukan.Latihan.Wajib.Militer> (accessed 29 November 2016).

⁵ See also *cnn indonesia*. (2015). "Luhut: Bela Negara untuk Disiplinkan Anak Muda" <http://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20151012154816-20-84473/luhut-bela-negara-untuk-disiplinkan-anak-muda/> (accessed 29 November 2016).

⁶ For example, see Homeland Security Advisory Council (2011). *Community Resilience Task Force Recommendations*. Washington DC: US of Department of Homeland Security. ppl. 8-11.

⁷ More explaining see Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. Chapter VI. Civil Defense

⁸ See Taylor, Brenda. (April, 2012). "The Evolution of National Security Studies". Occasional Paper No. 2 April 2012. Canberra: ANU. Specially Chapter 1

defense is focused more in form of civil defense to strengthen public response to non-military threats and tends to become part of the public participation in protecting and managing their territory to avoid non-military threat.

Based on Figure 1, the role of civil defense in response to non-state threat is visible in a more structured form. This indeed confirms that Civil Defense in this perspective is measurable and can be implemented easily by anyone who joined the Civil Defense program as a part of implementation of the National Defense.

However, in fact, the condition is not fully understood by some analyst, because of security in the context of the nation life has made the state and its citizens to consider any threat against the nation and its citizens as a threat that should be addressed seriously. Barry Buzan, divide security into three levels: individual, state and international levels⁹. These security levels are eventually strengthen security perspective in two categories: Traditional Security and Non-Traditional security, divided into five sectors: Political, Military, Economic, Social, and Environmental.¹⁰




Figure 1: Conceptual relationships among preparedness, resilience and risk reduction
Source: Homeland Security Advisory Council (2011)

This is exactly what lies inside Civil Defense focusing on response against disaster and non-military threats, where government considers the involvement of citizen in Civil Defense must be integrative and comprehensive in form of total defense governed by a number of obligations in peacetime. However, related to threat against the state, Civil Defense could be directed at strengthening support in form of Reserve Component and incorporated within paramilitary commando whose management is bound at the Defense Ministry, the Homeland Affair Ministry or Military Headquarters.

In the context of Indonesia, since the beginning, National Security is the responsibility of the state and its citizens. The existence of Civil Resilience Unit (*Pertahanan Sipil—Hansip*)¹¹, for example, is not limited to response against non-military threat, but also as part of the supporting component for State Defense. Although *Hansip* is dissolved now, the presence of *Hansip* became emphatic that factually and historically, Civil Defense in Indonesia is part of State Defense and integrates directly with National Defense. Later recognized that the existence of Civil Defense program in Indonesia is not well structured but only based on patriotism and the love of the homeland¹². The shape of Civil Defense is inherent in the practice of civil servants which is quite significant in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, Civil Defense is addressed with a number of rules forcing citizens to participate in the State and National defense. In the 1945 State Constitution, there are two articles defining the obligations and rights of citizens in an effort to State Defense: Article 27, Paragraph 3, "that every citizen has the right and shall participate in Defending the Country". While Article 30 Paragraph 1 and 2 are:

That every citizen is entitled and obliged to participate in the effort of State Defense and Security, and the role in State Defense and Security carried out through the Total Security System (*Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Semesta*) by the military and police as the main component, the People as a Component Support.

⁹ Buzan, Barry. *People*. (1981). *States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf. See also. Buzan, Barry. (1998). "Security, the State, the "New World Order," New York: Columbia University Press.

¹⁰ Buzan. *Op.cit.* (1998). Chapter 1 & 3.

¹¹ See *Republika* (2015). "Hansip Sudah Dibubarkan, Ini Dasar Hukumnya" <http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/14/11/20/nfcg3t-hansip-sudah-dibubarkan-ini-dasar-hukumnya> (accessed 1 December 2016).

¹² See also *BBC Indonesia*. (2015). "Dwi Fungsi ABRI, Asas tunggal Hingga P4" http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/laporan_khusus/2013/11/131125_lapsus_suharto_kebijakankeamananorba (accessed 1 December 2016).

In the context of Human Rights, related to Civil Defense, Law No. 39/1999 on Human Rights has also affirmed in Article 6B: "Every citizen shall participate in State Defense efforts, in accordance with applicable regulations".


But although there is no law that regulates direct State Defense Program, the existence of State Defense has also been affirmed in Law No. 3/2002 on National Defense. It is confirmed that Indonesia is a country that integrates Civil Defense as part of National Defense. This is stipulated in Article 9 paragraph 1, "Every Citizen is eligible and must participate in efforts of Civil Defense as Operation of State Defense". Article 9 Paragraph 2 stipulates as follows:

"The participation of citizens in State Defense stipulated in paragraph (1) shall be organized by: Civics, basic military training, voluntary or mandatory soldier in the Armed Forces or dedicate accordance with the profession"

Law No. 3/2002 Article 2 stipulates three affirmations: first, citizen is entitled and obliged in civic education, organized by the formal educational institutions and organized exclusively by the state. For the first assertion, citizens either directly or indirectly must build civic awareness and patriotism in various forms and expressions of life. In this context also the state must provide and organize civic education as part of the love of the homeland and the country.

Second, citizen is entitled and obliged to follow basic military training. Basic military training is in the programs of military service (conscription) that became the foundation for the existence of the reserve component and mobilization when the state requires.¹³ The program once attached to all citizens who become civil servants (PNS), but over time, basic military training is limited only on marching, but again the programs shall be integrated in form of Civil Defense training.¹⁴

Third, citizen can be voluntary or mandatory soldier and dedicate in accordance with the profession. This main foundation is citizen engagement as part of the reserve component. This is then why in the scheme of the non-organic country's defense, public involvement is designed at some levels. The reserve component, in the scheme of national defense, is complementary of the main component. The problem that arises is citizen involvement as backup component elements based on professional expertise, will be a logically reduce the number of organic military personnel¹⁵. A number of roles in the military organization that can be carried out by reserve component will be correlated with the number of organic military forces there. So the main component in the national defense, the organic armed forces personnel, will focus only on Combat Unit (Satpur) and combat support (Banpur), while administrative assistance can be partially or fully utilized by the reserve component.



Picture 2: Triangle of Reserve Component

3.0 Composition and implementation model of conscription

¹³ See *Liputan6.com* (2015). "Meramu Wajib Militer Ala Indonesia" ["http://news.liputan6.com/read/2339910/meramu-wajib-militer-ala-indonesia"](http://news.liputan6.com/read/2339910/meramu-wajib-militer-ala-indonesia) (accessed 1 December 2016).

¹⁴ *Tempo* (2015). "PNS Makassar Mulai Jalani Pendidikan Bela Negara" <http://nasional.tempco.co/read/news/2015/11/04/058715966/pns-makassar-mulai-jalani-pendidikan-bela-negara> (accessed 1 Desember 2016).

¹⁵Forexample, see. *Defensenews.com* (2015). "Germany Military Reserve Becomes More Important" <http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20120203/DEFREG01/302030001/German-Military-Reserve-Becomes-More-Important> (accessed 1 December 2016).

The debate related to the implementation of Civil Defense raised in the Post Soeharto era due to obscurity of the upcoming program where public felt that the organizer of the Civil Defense Program is not well prepared. This is confirmed by the maze in the implementation of the program, is limited to the strengthening of nationalism and patriotism values, or also touched on the basics of military material and the introduction of weapons.¹⁶

While in the substantive context, implementation of the Civil Defense Program also deemed not to have sufficient legal foundation for effective implementation of the program. This situation will also be correlated with the availability of supporting infrastructure, budgeting, coordination mechanisms among ministries and relevant agencies, and the purpose of the State Defense program in form of adjustment to the country's defense doctrine.¹⁷ In other words, the five prerequisites above must be fulfilled in order to initiate Civil Defense and could be correlated with the integrated country's defense needs.

Nevertheless, the Civil Defense program does not mean available at this time, but government should maintain current transition process to fulfill the preconditions mentioned above. Moreover, Civil Defense program implementation rests on the strengthening of other elements stipulated in three assertions mentioned earlier. Correlation between Civil Defense, Conscription and Reserve Component should be integrated in a program. Moreover, the National Defense Law allows these three integrated programs. Nevertheless, the existence of such programs should be aligned between the three. So it can only be the presence of these three programs simultaneously with emphases related to an ongoing inter-program.

There are six things that should be emphasized in the implementation of the Civil Defense correlated with Conscription and the reserve component: First, if the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Headquarters (TNI) wants to be involved from the beginning of the program, the program should synergize with the mandatory program of Military and Reserve Component. Because, all the outcomes of Civil Defense program have potentials to be part of the Conscript and Reserve Component.

Second, Ministry of Defense and the TNI headquarters as key institution of Civil Defense program rests on two things, the readiness of theory and curriculum and also readiness of infrastructure for practice and training. It is important to prepare them all, as a key institution, so it will be easier for the Ministry of Defense and the military to find figures with the necessary skills to be enlisted in the Civil Defense program or when it is integrated with *Komcad*.

Third, Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces took the initiative for coordination and cooperation with related ministries such as the Ministry of the Home Affair, Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Technology Research & Higher Education Affair (*Menristek*), Ministry of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucracy Reform Affair (*MenPAN and RB*), Ministry of Youth and Sport Affair (*Kemenpora*), Indonesia National Police and so on. This is in order to integrate third step in a program that is scalable and can be feeder for the sustainability of the Civil Defense.

Fourth, Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces should be able to explain to the public how Civil Defense Program is as part of basic foundation construction for patriotism, so that the next time the government has Conscription and Reserve Component program, the government already have data base of alumni from Civil Defense.

Fifth, Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces together with related Ministries proposed a Draft for the legality of Civil Defense, Conscription and also *Komcad*. The Draft is to facilitate the development of

¹⁶ *Kompas.com*. (2015). "Program Bela Negara Terkesan Dipaksakan". <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/10/13/08163421/Program.Bela.Negara.Terkesan.Dipaksakan> (accessed 2 December 2016).

¹⁷ *Kompas.com*. (2015). "Komisi I: Bela Negara Beda Dengan Wajib Militer". <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/10/13/07092821/Komisi.I.Bela.Negara.Beda.dengan.Wajib.Militer> (accessed 2 Desember 2016).

infrastructure and funding. Factually, the existence of this draft will facilitate the implementation of the program.

And sixth, the transition process of strengthening Civil Defense program, one of them is the curriculum for the program which requires integrated interests between Ministry of Defense, Armed Forces, other ministries and institutions. The main interest of the program should bind other state institutions associated to deal with traditional and non-traditional security threats. In other words, it will be a structured program to response against any threat to the country.

Referring to Figure 2, the composition of Civil Defense must be greater than Conscript and Reserve Component. This is due to five reasons: First, the state's obligation to make sure that every citizen has love for their homeland, patriotism and a desire to build a country with a high rests on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution So, the willingness to fight and defend the country can be implemented with good for various activities in the community.

Second, the implementation of civil defense in a peacetime mainly focused on non-security or non-traditional security threats. Thus, the existence of Civil Defense will be focused on strengthening responses against non-security threats such as disasters, forest fires, as well as emergency calls.

Third, infrastructure readiness and funding for sustainable programs where currently there is no legislation directly related to the Civil Defense, *Komcad* or Conscription. This step is a transition to the readiness of the plenary for legality, infrastructure, funding, coordination and doctrine associated with the integrated program based on the needs of National Defense.

Fourth, lack of changes in organic and non-organic Armed Forces personnel, which in certain retrofitting phases, organic personnel will be reduced in the scheme of early retirement programs or moratorium of recruitment within a certain period. So that, in the future, organic personnel with the Reserve Components will exist and support each other.

Fifth, coaching after the Civil Defense program will also be correlated with the strength of the needs of each government institutions, so that in the future, the involvement of Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces in the Civil Defense will only be limited to the curriculum, quality level, supporting personnel and infrastructure. Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces will focus on the development and management of programs, Conscript and *Komcad*.

With reference above, there are six models of relationship between the composition and the State Defense, Civil Defense and Reserve Components: First, the composition of 7-2-1 model, which emphasizes strengthening the composition of the State Defense program compared to the Conscript and *Komcad*. The explanation is that if there are 10 people who follow the Civil Defense program, two participants are proposed to join Conscript and one participant is proposed for the Reserve Components (*Komcad*). The rest remain focused on strengthening the love of the homeland, patriotism and sacrifice.



Figure 2:
Source: Compiled from Various Sources

This composition refers to a condition where the need for Conscript and *Komcad* by military and Ministry of Defense. It also means that in fact, the need for Conscript and *Komcad* in the military tend not to be a priority. This may be based on two issues: the national defense posture and disagreement from the Army since the program may reduce the number of organic personnel.

Second, the composition of 6-3-1 model, where out of ten people who followed the Civil Defense Program, there will be six people who would participate in full Civil Defense program, while three

others continue to Conscription program focusing on the use basic and medium military weapons. While the last one person, due to internal need of the military and the person's capacity, resume training as part of the *Komcad* personnel.

The second composition and model is based on the need to sustain the obligation to defend the country which demanding the ability of citizens in the context of State Defense operation. In this position also, it is only possible by the availability of infrastructure, budgets and policies. However, for the second composition and model, the government considers that personnel needed from conscription is assigned to fill areas that require a combination approaches such as civil-military personnel on the border, and also in region with long history of separatism like Aceh.

The third composition and model is 5-4-1, where out of ten people, only half taken full participants of the civil defense program, while other four taken Conscription program with higher specifications not just the introduction of military basic. More citizen involvement in the Conscription, based on the factual requirements, makes the need for citizens to follow the mandatory military program tend to be large. Moreover, the existence of conscription programs have also been supported by the legality that makes the government calculate on how much citizens needed to be involved in the Conscription program. One person follows the Reserve Component (*Komcad*) program. Still lack the reserve component involved in the program, because there is no policy that is open space for strengthening of reserve component personnel of the Ministry of Defense and the military.

The fourth composition and Model is 5-3-2, which is not different with the third model. The important thing is to distinguish the *Komcad* Program should be followed by more than one person. This can be interpreted in two ways, the increasing needs of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces with specialized people that is currently unavailable and/or the policy of integrating *Komcad* in the composition of organic military personnel, with the consequences of reduction of organic personnel gradually, in line with the needs of expert personnel.

The fifth composition and model is 4-4-2, the composition and the model is the integration between Civil Defense and Conscription. It is a civic duty in State Defense so that Civil Defense and Conscription are done simultaneously. The thing that distinguishes the two is the rotation program for citizens who have to follow the next stage, based on the state's ability to run the program on an ongoing basis. This composition and model also means stronger potential threat against the state, both from inside and outside. So, the country needs to prepare citizens for sudden mobilization in form of available Conscript.

In the context of the Conscription program, as well as on the fourth composition and model, the government felt that the inclusion of reserve components continuously become a necessity to enable the government to take advantage of citizens who have the required qualifications as a reserve component personnel.

The final composition and model is 4-3-3. It is the ideal composition and model for Civil Defense, Conscription and Reserve Component (*Komcad*). As a policy, the three programs need different leveling from the government. The third phase of the program is explicitly well managed by the government. Aside of that, citizens also know that after completing Civil Defense Program, the next step is to take part in Conscription, regulated by the government based on the State defense capabilities.

In addition, citizens also understand that the government, in this case the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces requires support from citizens with good qualifications and capability to support the tasks and functions of national defense in the Conscription program.

Based on all six compositions and models above, Civil Defense program can be done by taking into account of state's liability. Issues relating to legality, infrastructure, budget, coordination and doctrine reinforce the existence of the program and tailored to fulfill targets of five prerequisites. In other

words, civil defense program can be adapted to country's ability to meet the requirements mentioned. If the country cannot meet these five preconditions, it would be best to use simple composition and models based on the requirements and potential threats as the basis for the organization of the Civil Defense program.

4.0 Conclusion

Civil Defense Program is an integrated program with the national security policy. Civil Defense Program ideal focus is based on five prerequisites: relevant legal aspect of Civil Defense program, availability of supporting infrastructure, budgeting, coordination mechanisms among ministries and agencies, and the purpose of the State Defense program. Before the government meets five preconditions of the implementation of Civil Defense, the composition and the model can be adapted to the needs of the program. Therefore, the relation between Civil Defense program with conscription and *Komcad* is as an integrated program. Civil Defense Program is linear and continuously in line with the Conscription and *Komcad*. Whenever a Civil Defense program is done, automatically, there will be offers for personnel to join conscription or *Komcad* with the integrated composition and program depends on threat perspective, ability of the state and the need for citizen mobilization against specific threats.

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